

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

VERITAS OPERATING CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION, a Washington
corporation,

Defendant.

CASE NO. C06-0703-JCC

ORDER

MICROSOFT CORPORATION, a Washington
corporation,

Counterclaim Plaintiff,

v.

VERITAS OPERATING CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation, and VERITAS
SOFTWARE CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation,

Counterclaim Defendants.

1 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Microsoft Corporation
2 (Microsoft)'s Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Veritas' Claims for Breach of Contract (Dkt.
3 No. 210), Veritas Operating Corporation (Veritas)'s Response opposing the motion (Dkt. No. 291), and
4 Microsoft's Reply (Dkt. No. 333). The Court has carefully considered these papers and their supporting
5 declarations and exhibits and has determined that oral argument is not necessary. The Court hereby
6 DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART the motion and rules as follows.

7 **I. BACKGROUND**

8 In its broadest sense, this complicated contract dispute centers on the question of whether
9 Microsoft denied Veritas the benefit of its bargain by using Veritas' confidential information related to
10 volume management computer technology in violation of Microsoft's various contractual obligations not
11 to compete with Veritas.

12 Over a decade ago, when the ill-fated business relationship between these parties began in 1996,
13 Veritas had a strong reputation for providing high-end volume management technology suitable for
14 business servers. (Def.'s Mot. 2 (Dkt. No. 210 at 3).) Such technology "allows data to be stored reliably
15 and manipulated uniformly without regard to potential differences in physical storage devices, essential to
16 the data storage needs of many medium and large business enterprises." (Compl. ¶ 9 (Dkt. No. 1 at 4).)
17 Microsoft, for its part, had already released its first server operating system, Windows NT, with its own
18 "rudimentary" technology for storage management, called FT Disk. (*Id.* ¶ 10 (Dkt. No. 1 at 4–5).)
19 Microsoft recognized that its volume management technology was not serving the needs of high-end
20 business customers and decided that rather than invest in further development of FT Disk, "it would be
21 better off capitalizing on Veritas' reputation" because "customers would be more likely to buy servers
22 running the Windows operating system if Veritas' high end volume management products were available
23 for Windows[.]" (Def.'s Mot. 2 (Dkt. No. 210 at 3).) At that time, Veritas' volume management
24 technology was available only for Unix-based operating systems. (*Id.*)

25 With that expectation, Microsoft approached Veritas with the idea of joining forces. On August
26 ORDER – 2

1 19, 1996, the parties entered a development and license agreement (“Agreement”) whereby Veritas
2 promised to provide Microsoft with the source code for its volume management technology, called
3 Logical Disk Manager (LDM), to be embedded in the next version of the Windows NT operating system,
4 Windows NT 5.0, later renamed Windows 2000. (Agreement (Dkt. No. 211-2).) Veritas’ express
5 objective in entering the Agreement with Microsoft was “to build a Windows NT Add-on products
6 business[.]” (*Id.* at 1 (Dkt. No. 211-2 at 2).) In other words, Veritas planned to develop and market to
7 Windows customers certain volume management-related features, or increased capabilities, that were not
8 included in the base LDM to be embedded in Windows 2000. (*Id.* Original Exhibit A § 2.3 (Dkt. No.
9 211-3 at 5).)

10 Section 2.3 of Exhibit A to the Agreement listed certain features that were to be included in the
11 Veritas Add-on product. (*Id.*) Additionally, Appendix A-1 attached to the Agreement contained a chart
12 that identified certain features and designated whether the feature existed or would be included in the
13 current Windows NT 4.0 (using FT Disk) or the upcoming Windows NT 5.0 (using the embedded
14 product), or whether such feature was to be included in the Veritas Add-on product. (*Id.* Appendix A-1
15 (Dkt. No. 211-3 at 11).) Veritas takes the position that the Agreement thus specifically reserved certain
16 features to be the exclusive province of Veritas for developing and marketing to Windows users. (Compl.
17 ¶ 13 (Dkt. No. 1 at 6).) The Agreement restricted Microsoft’s ability to use Veritas’ confidential
18 information, including its source code, to create competing products. (Agreement § 12.3 (Dkt. No. 211-2
19 at 16); Amendment § 12.3 (Dkt. No. 211-4 at 6–7).) Microsoft was specifically prohibited from using
20 Veritas’ confidential information, including its source code, to develop replacements for the embedded
21 LDM. (Agreement § 12.2 (Dkt. No. 211-2 at 16); Amendment §§ 12.3, 12.8 (Dkt. No. 211-4 at 6–8).)

22 Because Veritas’ existing volume management software was Unix-based, rather than Windows-
23 based, work remained to be completed before the product could be made available to Windows
24 customers. (Def.’s Mot. 2 (Dkt. No. 210 at 3).) In order to facilitate this work under the time pressure
25 imposed by Microsoft’s Windows 2000 shipping date, Veritas converted (or “ported”) the majority of its
26

1 copyrighted volume management source code, rather than just the necessary components, so that
2 Microsoft and Veritas engineers could quickly integrate LDM with Windows. (*Id.*; Compl. ¶ 18 (Dkt.
3 No. 1 at 7).) The source code ported and shared with Microsoft included disabled portions of code that
4 related to Add-on features subject to the restrictions in the Agreement. (Compl. ¶ 19 (Dkt. No. 1 at 8).)
5 Thus, Microsoft developers would have been able to see Veritas' confidential source code for existing
6 Add-on capabilities, even though the embedded product would not perform such functions.

7 Under the Agreement, Microsoft was permitted to make changes to Veritas' code for the
8 purposes of bug-fixing and integration with Windows. (Agreement § 2.1.3 (Dkt. No. 211-2 at 5).)
9 Microsoft was not permitted, however, to make changes that would "result in changes to the Defined
10 Interface or feature listing." (*Id.* § 3.5 (Dkt. No. 211-2 at 7).) Maintaining the "defined interface" was
11 necessary for Veritas to be able to make compatible Add-ons. Microsoft also agreed to deliver to Veritas
12 any modified code, to ensure that Veritas could continue to develop compatible Add-ons. (*Id.*)

13 The parties diverge in their accounts as to the quality of Veritas' contribution in making LDM
14 suitable for shipment in Windows 2000. Veritas claims that Microsoft's tests of LDM showed that
15 Microsoft was "impressed that the LDM code base and UI worked as well as it did" in 1998. (Pl.'s Resp.
16 7 (Dkt. No. 291 at 10).) Veritas asserts also that a "significant number of Veritas developers and testers
17 worked on the LDM code until the end to ensure a successful release for Windows 2000." (*Id.* at 8 (Dkt.
18 No. 291 at 11).) Microsoft, however, argues that Microsoft "expressed deep dissatisfaction with the
19 quality of Veritas' engineering" and "expended far more engineering resources than should have been
20 necessary in fixing and improving LDM, first in the push to get a marginally adequate version shipped in
21 Windows 2000, and later to make the changes in its basic engineering necessary to properly integrate it
22 with Windows[.]" (Def.'s Mot. 3, 7 (Dkt. No. 210 at 4, 8).)

23 One way or another, on December 15, 1999, Microsoft released Windows 2000, containing the
24 embedded LDM. (*Id.* at 8 (Dkt. No. 210 at 9).) On December 17, 1999, the parties amended the
25 Agreement. (*Id.*) The amendment, according to Microsoft, "acted as a 'performance improvement plan'

1 for Veritas, setting standards for the quality of Veritas' engineers and imposing deadlines for Veritas'
2 achievement of milestones in developing the add-ons." (*Id.*) Microsoft asserts that the amendment also
3 removed the restrictions on Microsoft's ability to change the LDM code and to create new features that
4 previously were reserved for Veritas. (*Id.*) Veritas argues that Microsoft knew that the amendment did
5 not change "the existence of reserved features after the shipment of Windows 2000[.]" (Pl.'s Resp. 13
6 (Dkt. No. 291 at 16).)

7 In 2002, Microsoft attempted to rework the amended Agreement, as well as two other of the
8 parties' agreements that in sum defined the parties' existing business relationship. (Pl.'s Resp. 10 (Dkt.
9 No. 291 at 13); Framework Agreement Recitals (Dkt. No. 296-6 at 55).) Veritas claims that
10 "[u]nbeknownst to Veritas, by that time Microsoft was well on its way to using Veritas' Confidential
11 Information to develop a replacement for LDM, which became known as LVM." (*Id.*) As part of the
12 "Framework" negotiations between the parties that took place over the course of the next two years,
13 according to Veritas, "Microsoft proposed obtaining (a) an unfettered license to both Veritas' Embedded
14 Product source code and certain other Veritas source code . . . and (b) a broad retroactive license to all
15 of Veritas' intellectual property, providing a release of all potential claims by Veritas for Microsoft's
16 prior breaches and misuse of Confidential Information." (Pl.'s Resp. 11 (Dkt. No. 291 at 14).) The
17 negotiations ended in impasse. (Def.'s Mot. 12 (Dkt. No. 210 at 13).) Meanwhile, Microsoft continued
18 make improvements to the LDM code for the release of Windows Server 2003, in April 2003. (Pl.'s
19 Resp. 8 (Dkt. No. 291 at 11–12).)

20 On April 9, 2004, Microsoft exercised its buy-out rights under Section 5.3 of the Agreement.
21 (Def.'s Mot. 12 (Dkt. No. 210 at 13).) Microsoft claims that this buy-out gave Microsoft "expansive
22 rights to the Embedded Product," including the right to make additions to it. (Def.'s Mot. 12 (Dkt. No.
23 210 at 13).) Veritas claims that the buy-out did not authorize Microsoft to use Veritas' confidential
24 information to create a supplanting product or to create features reserved to Veritas. (Pl.'s Resp. 26
25 (Dkt. No. 291 at 29).) If the buy-out did give Microsoft such rights, Veritas argues, there would have
26 ORDER – 5

1 been no need for Microsoft to attempt to negotiate for those rights during the failed Framework
2 negotiations. (*Id.*)

3 In May 2004, Microsoft released to Veritas and other companies attending the Windows
4 Hardware Engineering Conference (WinHEC) an early, binary version of LVM, the volume management
5 technology to be embedded in the newest client version of Windows, called Windows Vista (then named
6 Longhorn), and Windows Server 2008. (Def.'s Mot. 3, 13 (Dkt. No. 210 at 4, 14); Compl. ¶ 27 (Dkt.
7 No. 1 at 11).) Veritas claims that in Vista, "Microsoft improperly included code implementing a number
8 of features that the Agreement exclusively reserved for Veritas Add-on Products." (Compl. ¶ 28 (Dkt.
9 No. 1 at 12).) These included VDS ("a common interface for hardware and software RAID volumes")
10 and VSS ("a common interface for hardware-based snapshots"). (*Id.*) Additionally, according to Veritas,
11 LVM was a supplanting product that impermissibly replaced LDM because it was based on Veritas'
12 confidential information. (Compl. ¶ 37 (Dkt. No. 1 at 15).)

13 Microsoft argues that LVM is not a supplanting product but instead, a "much-improved,
14 upgraded Embedded Product." (Def.'s Mot. 3 (Dkt. No. 210 at 4).) Further, Microsoft argues, such
15 improvements were permitted under the Agreement so long as Microsoft retained compatibility with the
16 Veritas Add-ons by maintaining the Defined Interfaces. (*Id.* at 2 (Dkt. No. 210 at 3).) Microsoft asserts
17 also that after the Agreement was amended, no features were reserved exclusively for Veritas. (*Id.* at 4
18 (Dkt. No. 210 at 5).) According to Microsoft, after December 15, 2000, the Agreement gave Microsoft
19 the right to include any Add-on features in LVM. (*Id.* at 4 (Dkt. No. 210 at 5).) Alternatively, Microsoft
20 argues, even if such features were reserved, no such features exist in LVM. (*Id.*)

21 In July 2005, Veritas was acquired by Symantec. (Def.'s Mot. 14 (Dkt. No. 210 at 15).) In May
22 2006, Veritas filed the instant lawsuit, claiming, *inter alia*, that Microsoft violated the Agreement and
23 committed an array of tortious acts by developing LVM using Veritas' confidential information. (Compl.
24 (Dkt. No. 1).) Microsoft now asks the Court to dismiss two of Veritas' breach of contract claims as a
25 matter of law: "(1) that Microsoft included volume management 'features' in its operating system that the
26 ORDER – 6

1 Agreement ‘reserved’ for Veritas; and (2) that LVM is a ‘Supplanting Product’ that uses Veritas’
 2 Confidential Information in breach of contract limitations.” (Def.’s Mot. 15 (Dkt. No. 210 at 16).)
 3 Microsoft also argues that the Agreement’s limitation of liability provision bars Veritas’ recovery of lost
 4 profits, and that Veritas’ damages, if any, are capped at \$ 4 million. (*Id.* at 28 (Dkt. No. 210 at 29).)¹

5 **II. APPLICABLE STANDARD**

6 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
 7 admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
 8 material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
 9 56(c). “A ‘material’ fact is one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and whose existence
 10 might affect the outcome of the suit.” *T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n*, 809 F.2d
 11 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of
 12 material fact exists. *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). If the
 13 moving party meets this initial burden, then the party opposing the motion must set forth facts showing
 14 that there is a genuine issue for trial. *See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc.*, 809 F.2d at 630. He or she must “do
 15 more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” *Matsushita Elec.*
 16 *Indus. Co.*, 475 U.S. at 586. “In response to a summary judgment motion, . . . the plaintiff can no longer
 17 rest on . . . mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts, . . . which for
 18 the purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true.” *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*,
 19 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of
 20 a genuine issue of material fact, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” *Celotex*
 21 *Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986).

22
 23 ¹Additionally, Microsoft asserts that Veritas’ tort claims are barred by the Economic Loss Rule.
 24 (*Id.*) Because the parties have briefed the tort claims issue more fully as related to Microsoft’s motion for
 25 summary judgment on Counts I, III–V, VII (Dkt. No. 212), the Court will address that issue in the Order
 addressing that motion.

1 Additionally, “[u]nder Washington law, contract interpretation is governed by the ‘context rule,’
 2 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 212, 214(c) (1981).” *Verizon Nw. Inc. v. Worldcom, Inc.*,
 3 61 F. App’x 388, 392 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing *Berg v. Hudesman*, 801 P.2d 222, 229–30 (Wash. 1999)).
 4 “In contrast to the ‘plain meaning’ rule, the ‘context rule’ permits a court to look at extrinsic evidence to
 5 discern the meaning or intent of words or terms used by contracting parties, even when the parties’ words
 6 appear to the court to be clear and unambiguous.” *Id.* Such extrinsic evidence can include “the subject
 7 matter and objective of the contract, all the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract, the
 8 subsequent acts and conduct of the parties to the contract, and the reasonableness of respective
 9 interpretations advocated by the parties.” *Baldwin v. Trailer Inns, Inc.*, 266 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir.
 10 2001). Further, a “question of interpretation of an integrated agreement is to be determined by the trier of
 11 fact if it depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences to be
 12 drawn from extrinsic evidence. Otherwise a question of interpretation of an agreement is to be
 13 determined as a question of law.” *Berg v. Hudesman*, 801 P.2d 222, 229 (Wash. 1990).

14 III. ANALYSIS

15 A. Whether Microsoft Breached the Agreement by Including Features in Vista and 16 Windows Server 2008 that are Exclusively Reserved to Veritas

17 Veritas claims that Microsoft breached the Agreement by “including features in its operating
 18 system products that are exclusively reserved for Veritas[.]” (Compl. ¶ 63 (Dkt. No. 1 at 23).) Microsoft
 19 disputes this issue on the basis that the 1999 amendment to the Agreement obliterated any notion that
 20 certain features were exclusively reserved for Veritas. (Def.’s Mot. 4 (Dkt. No. 210 at 5).) Microsoft
 21 argues alternatively that even if certain features were still reserved for Veritas, no such features exist in
 22 Vista or Windows Server 2008. (*Id.*) The latter question of whether LVM, VDS, or VSS include certain
 23 features requires expert testimony and a complex evaluation of code, and as such, the Court finds the
 24 issue inappropriate for disposal at the summary judgment stage.

25 In arguing that the amendment eliminated any reservation of features to Veritas, Microsoft relies

1 upon the Agreement's sections 1.2 (referring to Exhibit A); the amendment's deletion of Exhibit A;
 2 amended section 3.4, ending a stand-back period regarding enhancements on December 15, 2000; and the
 3 absence of any claim that Microsoft included reserved features before December 15, 2000.

4 Section 1.2 defines the "embedded product" that was to be included in the Microsoft operating
 5 system:

6 "Embedded Product" means a subset of the VM Software or any successor or replacement
 7 product which subset is adapted for inclusion in the MICROSOFT System Product. Such
 8 subset will be *limited to features and capacities as specified in the description of the*
9 Embedded Product in Exhibit A. The Embedded Product includes substantial VERITAS
 10 Add-on Product code (the "VERITAS Add-on Product Code Subset"). *Exhibit A may be*
11 amended by mutual agreement of MICROSOFT and VERITAS as per the terms of this
12 Agreement. The Embedded Product shall include all subsets of the VM software or
 13 successor or replacement products thereof meeting the foregoing description.

14 (Agreement § 1.2 (Dkt. No. 211-2 at 3) (emphasis added).) The original Exhibit A, referred to in this
 15 section, is a nine-page "overview" of the volume management software, the embedded product, and
 16 Veritas Add-on products. (Dkt. No. 211-3.) Exhibit A, in turn, refers to Appendix A-1, which contains
 17 "details on volume management capabilities." (Agreement Original Exhibit A § 2.5 (Dkt. No. 211-3 at
 18 6.) Appendix A-1 is a chart that names and describes certain features, and states whether each feature is
 19 or will be contained in Microsoft's operating system Windows NT 4.0 (using FT Disk), in the embedded
 20 product in Windows NT 5.0 (Windows 2000), or in a Veritas Add-on. (Appendix A-1 (Dkt. No. 211-3 at
 21 11.) It is this chart from whence Veritas derives its reservation of features. (Pl.'s Resp. 19 (Dkt. No. 291
 22 at 22).)

23 Microsoft argues that per the 1999 amendment, the original Exhibit A referred to in section 1.2
 24 was deleted and replaced by a new Exhibit A (Dkt. No. 211-4 at 11), thereby eliminating any reservation
 25 to Veritas of any features. (Def.'s Mot. 8 (Dkt. No. 210 at 9).) The Court is not persuaded by this
 26 argument, since the replacement Exhibit A clearly refers to Appendix A-1 and moreover states that
 Appendix A-1 "provides a matrix that compares features of the Windows NT 4.0 FT disk driver, the
 Embedded Product in Windows 2000, and *contemplated features for the Veritas Add-On.*" (New Exhibit

1 A (Dkt. No. 211-4 at 12) (emphasis added.) The statement is in the present tense, indicating that the
 2 parties considered the Appendix to remain a viable part of the amended contract. Confirming this
 3 proposition, a May 2000 email from Microsoft software developer Catherine van Ingen shows that at that
 4 time, Microsoft still treated Appendix A-1 as relevant: “We should talk more in the June time frame about
 5 possibly migrating features from Appendix A-1 to the embedded product.” (Def.’s Mot. 10 (Dkt. No.
 6 210 at 11).) Van Ingen also stated in a June 2000 email that “Exhibit A-1 features are no-nos.” (Pl.’s
 7 Resp. 2 (Dkt. No. 291 at 5).)

8 Microsoft argues that Appendix A-1 refers only to features that would be reserved to Veritas
 9 during the time frame leading up to Windows 2000, not in later Windows operating systems. (Def.’s Mot.
 10 17 (Dkt. No. 210 at 18).) The Court is not persuaded by this argument because section 1.5 of the
 11 amended Agreement, which establishes the definitions and therefore the scope of the entire Agreement,
 12 defines the term “Microsoft System Product,” referred to in section 1.2 above, as including Microsoft
 13 Windows 2000 and “updates and new releases[.]” (Amendment § 1.5 (Dkt. No. 211-4 at 2).) Therefore,
 14 whatever restrictions applied to Microsoft regarding the embedded product and Add-ons as to Microsoft
 15 Windows 2000 applied with equal force to later releases of the Windows operating system, including
 16 Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008.

17 Microsoft argues that regardless of the viability of Appendix A-1, the amended section 3.4
 18 allowed Microsoft to develop and distribute any features, including those listed in Appendix A-1. (Def.’s
 19 Mot. 18 (Dkt. No. 210 at 19).) Section 3.4 states that:

20 For a period from the Amendment Date [December 17, 1999] until one year after the
 21 RTM [release to manufacture] of Windows 2000 [December 15, 2000], MICROSOFT
 22 shall be entitled to distribute only those Enhancements necessary for (i) fixing bugs or
 23 errors in the Embedded Product or (ii) integration (or improved integration) with the
 24 Windows 2000 operating system kernel. *After such period, MICROSOFT shall be entitled*
to distribute any and all Enhancements made by or for MICROSOFT.

25 (Amendment § 3.4 (Dkt. No. 211-4 at 3) (emphasis added.).) In section 1.3, the parties define
 26 “Enhancements” as “improvements *and* new features developed for inclusion in the Embedded Product.”

1 (Agreement § 1.3 (Dkt. No. 211-2 at 3) (emphasis added).) This language standing alone does suggest
 2 that Microsoft was allowed to distribute new features to the embedded product after December 15, 2000.
 3 However, the contract must be read in its entirety. In section 2.1.3, which the parties did not amend and
 4 thus which remained in force after 1999, Veritas granted Microsoft the right to

5 modify the source code of the Embedded Product for the purposes of fixing bugs, creating
 6 integration and consistency with the other components of the MICROSOFT System
 7 Product, adjusting to MICROSOFT or industry programming standards that
 8 MICROSOFT adopts, and tuning of performance, *provided that such modifications shall
 not result in creation of new features* or material changes (i.e., changes that prevent
 compatibility with the VERITAS Add-on Products) to the then-current Defined
 Interface[.]

9 (Agreement § 2.1.3 (Dkt. No. 211-2 at 5) (emphasis added).) Further, and perhaps more importantly,
 10 section 3.3, which also remained in effect after the amendment, required Microsoft to seek Veritas'
 11 consent before it "migrate[d] features from the Veritas Add-on Products to the Embedded Product[.]"

12 (Agreement § 3.3 (Dkt. No. 211-2 at 6).) Thus, it is not entirely clear from the language of the contract
 13 whether the parties intended by the amended section 3.4 to allow Microsoft to add new features after
 14 December 15, 2000, that were previously reserved to Veritas.

15 The parties' actions clearly do not support such an interpretation. Because of the context rule, the
 16 Court may look to extrinsic evidence that does not contradict the terms of the agreement. There is
 17 abundant evidence that Microsoft believed certain features were still reserved for Veritas after December
 18 15, 2000. For example, in a February 2002 email to van Ingen, Microsoft employee Sara Schumacher
 19 referred to "contractual restrictions on LVM functionality" and noted four features (hot spare, grow
 20 mirrors, N-way mirrors, and striping with parity) that were allegedly reserved to Veritas in Appendix A-
 21 1, as "functions we cannot build into the UI[.]" (Schumacher Email Feb. 7, 2002 (Dkt. No. 296-6 at 85).)

22 Additionally, in a June 2002 internal Microsoft presentation on LVM development for Windows Vista
 23 and Server 2008, Cristian Teodorescu, one of Microsoft's primary developers of the LVM code, stated
 24 that as to "New Features," "[t]he design accommodates some features banned by our contract with
 25 Veritas. Shipping such features is subject to contract limitations." (Presentation Slide 647 (Dkt. No. 296-

7 at 29.) Further, a December 2004 email from Teodorescu states that “extending spanned/RAID-
 2 5/mirrored volumes is on the list of features reserved for VRTS.” (Teodorescu Email Dec. 16, 2004 (Dkt.
 3 No. 296-7 at 41).) Moreover, the fact that Microsoft was willing to remove eleven of the new features
 4 when confronted by Veritas is some evidence, even if ultimately not conclusive, that Microsoft believed it
 5 did not have the legal right to include such features in Vista and Windows Server 2008. (Def.’s Mot. 14
 6 (Dkt. No. 210 at 15); Pl.’s Resp. 15 (Dkt. No. 291 at 18).)

7 In sum, Veritas has raised at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Microsoft
 8 breached the Agreement by including features in Vista and Windows Server 2008 that are exclusively
 9 reserved to Veritas. Accordingly, the Court denies Microsoft’s motion as to that issue.

10 **B. Whether Microsoft Impermissibly Used Veritas’ Confidential Information to
 Develop LVM, VDS, and VSS**

11 Veritas alleges that Microsoft impermissibly used Veritas’ confidential information to develop
 12 LVM, as well as two features called VDS and VSS. (Compl. ¶¶ 29, 42, 43, 63 (Dkt. No. 1 at 12, 17,
 13 23).) Microsoft disputes this charge on the basis that LVM is not a “Supplanting Product” that misuses
 14 Veritas’ confidential information but is rather an enhanced embedded product that permissibly modifies
 15 Veritas’ LDM code. (Def.’s Mot. 18–25 (Dkt. No. 210 at 19–26).) Additionally, Microsoft argues, VSS
 16 and VDS use LDM/LVM code only to the extent that linkage with LVM is necessary, allegedly a
 17 permissible use authorized by Veritas. (*Id.* at 26 (Dkt. No. 210 at 27).) Microsoft argues that moreover,
 18 even if LVM is a supplanting product, after Microsoft exercised its buy-out rights under section 5.3 of
 19 the Agreement, Microsoft was permitted to use the LDM code for any purpose, even making derivative
 20 works. (*Id.* at 25 (Dkt. No. 210 at 26).)

21 Under the Agreement, Veritas authorized Microsoft to:

22 modify the source code of the Embedded Product for the purposes of fixing bugs, creating
 23 integration and consistency with the other components of the MICROSOFT System
 24 Product, adjusting to MICROSOFT or industry programming standards that
 25 MICROSOFT adopts, and tuning of performance, provided that such modifications shall
 not result in creation of new features or material changes (i.e., changes that prevent
 compatibility with the VERITAS Add-on Products) to the then-current Defined

1 Interface[.]

2 (Agreement § 2.1.3 (Dkt. No. 211-2 at 5).) Microsoft was also permitted to enhance the Embedded
3 Product, provided that it notified Veritas, gave Veritas the opportunity to “comment on the planned
4 Enhancement[,]” and provided Veritas with the modified code and programmer’s notes so that Veritas
5 could make compatible Add-ons. (Agreement § 3.1 (Dkt. No. 211-2 at 6).) Such modifications were
6 allowed as long as they did not “result in changes to the Defined Interface or feature listing.” (Agreement
7 § 3.5 (Dkt. No. 211-2 at 7).) In addition, Microsoft was permitted to develop a Supplanting Product (ie.
8 “software code which replaces substantial portions of or the entire Embedded Product”) if it provided
9 Veritas written notice of its intent to develop one. (Agreement §§ 1.8, 5.2 (Dkt. No. 211-2 at 4, 8).)
10 However, the Agreement expressly prohibited Microsoft’s use of “VERITAS Confidential Information to
11 create a supplanting product.” (Agreement § 12.2 (Dkt. No. 211-2 at 16).)

12 The Court finds that the questions of whether LVM is a “Supplanting Product” or just an
13 improved version of LDM, and whether Microsoft used Veritas’ confidential information to develop it,
14 are not questions appropriate for resolution at the summary judgment stage. As Microsoft has
15 acknowledged, determining to what extent Microsoft included or relied upon LDM code in developing
16 LVM requires a comparison of LDM and LVM code. (Def.’s Second Supplemental Resp. to Veritas’
17 Interrog. No. 6 (Dkt. No. 296-6 at 44).) “Performing such a comparison is a complex and time-
18 consuming task that only an expert can perform. LDM and LVM each consist of over 100,000 lines of
19 code.” (*Id.*) Weighing the parties’ respective expert testimony as to this question is properly left to the
20 jury. Likewise, the question of whether and to what extent VDS and VSS use LDM or LVM code is a
21 factual issue subject to the evaluation of experts, and such expert testimony will need to be weighed by
22 the fact-finder.

23 Further, the Court is not persuaded by Microsoft’s argument that so long as LVM maintained the
24 Defined Interfaces, it was not a supplanting product. (Def.’s Mot. 21 (Dkt. No. 210 at 22).) The contract
25 definition of “Supplanting Product” nowhere includes this characterization. The mere fact that the
26 ORDER – 13

1 Agreement permitted enhancements that did not alter the defined interfaces or create new features does
2 not logically mean that so long as the Defined Interfaces are maintained, Microsoft has not created a
3 Supplanting Product. Moreover, Veritas disputes whether LVM does, in fact, maintain the Defined
4 Interfaces, particularly in Windows Server 2008. (Pl.’s Mot. 25 (Dkt. No. 291 at 28).) Therefore, there is
5 a disputed issue of material fact as to this issue.

6 Nor is the Court persuaded by Microsoft’s argument that after the buy-out, it was free to use the
7 LDM code in any manner it wished. Under section 5.3, Microsoft “acquire[d] additional license rights to
8 the Embedded Product.” (Agreement § 5.3 (Dkt. No. 211-2 at 9).) Microsoft was permitted “to exercise
9 any and all rights of ownership” including “the rights to make, use, reproduce, disclose, modify, adapt,
10 create derivative works based on or incorporating some or all of the Embedded Product[,]” though it was
11 not permitted to create derivative works of the Embedded Product using the Veritas Add-on Product
12 Code Subset (AOPCS). (Agreement § 5.3 (Dkt. No. 211-2 at 9).)

13 Whether Microsoft used AOPCS to develop LVM is not a question that may be resolved on
14 summary judgment; it is a factual issue that must be determined by the fact-finder. Further, Veritas argues
15 that the buy-out provision did not entitle Microsoft to use Veritas’ confidential information to supplant
16 LDM, it merely gave Microsoft the right to modify LDM. (Pl.’s Resp. 11 (Dkt. No. 291 at 14).) Again,
17 whether LVM was a modification of LDM or a supplanting product is for the jury to determine.

18 Veritas asserts that Microsoft knew that the buy-out did not afford it all the rights it needed to
19 legally distribute Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008; otherwise, Microsoft would not have tried
20 to waive its buy-out rights in exchange for broader rights during the Framework negotiations. (Pl.’s Resp.
21 11–12 (Dkt. No. 291 at 14–15).) Veritas points to an April 2004 draft of the Framework Agreement as
22 an acknowledgment by Microsoft that the buy-out would not “cleanse the prior breaches of the
23 Agreement.” (Pl.’s Resp. 12 (Dkt. No. 291 at 15).) The Framework Agreement draft recitals state that
24 Microsoft included certain volume management technology in its products and that Microsoft did not
25 have “all appropriate rights to that technology[.]” (Framework Agreement Recitals (Dkt. No. 296-6 at
26 ORDER – 14

1 55.) If the buy-out provided retroactive rights to Veritas' confidential information, Veritas argues, there
 2 would have been no need for Microsoft to negotiate for those retroactive rights during the Framework
 3 negotiations. (Pl.'s Resp. 12 n.40 (Dkt. No. 291 at 15).) The Court finds that Microsoft has not carried
 4 its burden at the summary judgment stage of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact as
 5 to whether the buy-out provision entitled it to develop LVM using Veritas' confidential information.

6 **C. Whether the Agreement's Limitation of Liability Provision Bars Veritas' Recovery
 7 of Any Lost Profits and Otherwise Caps Damages at \$4 Million**

8 The Agreement's limitation of liability provision states that:

9 Neither party shall be liable hereunder for any loss of data, *profits* or use of the products,
 10 or for any special, incidental, indirect or consequential damages arising out of or in
 11 connection with the use or performance of the VM Software, Veritas Products or Related
 12 Services, Microsoft System Product, or other Microsoft Products or related services. In
 13 no event will Veritas be liable hereunder to end users or resellers of Microsoft for any
 14 damages whatsoever. *With the exception of* liability of either party under Section 14 (on
 15 indemnification) and *breaches by either party of restrictions under this agreement on its*
 16 *use or disclosure of the source code of the other party*, the maximum liability of either
 17 party to the other under this agreement shall be the greater of \$1,000,000 or the dollar
 18 amount of payments Veritas has received from Microsoft.

19 (Agreement § 17 (Dkt. No. 211-2 at 23) (emphasis added).)

20 Microsoft argues that this provision bars Veritas' recovery of lost profits and also caps Veritas'
 21 damages, if any, at \$4 million, which is the amount of payments that Veritas has received from Microsoft.
 22 (Def.'s Mot. 28 (Dkt. No. 210 at 29).) Veritas counters that the damages cap does not apply to
 23 Microsoft's breaches of restrictions on the use or disclosure of Veritas' confidential information. (Pl.'s
 24 Resp. 29 (Dkt. No. 291 at 32).) The Court finds that, as discussed above, determining whether and the
 25 extent to which Microsoft misused or improperly disclosed Veritas' source code is a determination that
 26 must be made by the fact-finder and is not appropriate for disposition at summary judgment. Therefore,
 the Court cannot determine at this stage whether the damages cap will apply.

The Court, however, is persuaded that Veritas may not recover lost profits, because Veritas has
 expressly contracted away its right to recover them in the limitation of liability provision quoted above.
 Veritas has not disputed this issue in its response brief. (Def.'s Reply 13 (Dkt. No. 333 at 16).)

1 **D. Whether Veritas' Tort Claims are Barred Under the Economic Loss Rule**

2 As the Court noted above, the parties have briefed the tort claims issue more fully as related to
3 Microsoft's motion for summary judgment on Counts I, III–V, VII (Dkt. No. 212), and accordingly, the
4 Court reserves its ruling as to that issue until the Court fully considers that motion.

5 **IV. CONCLUSION**

6 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART
7 Microsoft's motion for summary judgment on Veritas' breach of contract claims, as follows:

8 Microsoft's request that the Court dismiss Veritas' claim that Microsoft breached the Agreement
9 by including features in Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008 that are exclusively reserved to
10 Veritas is hereby DENIED;

11 Microsoft's request that the Court dismiss Veritas' claim that Microsoft breached the Agreement
12 by impermissibly using Veritas' confidential information to develop LVM, VDS, and VSS is hereby
13 DENIED;

14 Microsoft's request that the Court find that the Agreement bars Veritas' recovery of lost profits is
15 hereby GRANTED;

16 Microsoft's request that the Court find at this stage that the Agreement caps Veritas' damages at
17 \$4 million is hereby DENIED; and

18 the Court RESERVES its ruling on whether Veritas' tort claims are barred under the Economic
19 Loss Rule, pending its consideration of Microsoft's motion for summary judgment on Counts I, III–V,
20 VII (Dkt. No. 212).

21 DATED this 24th day of January, 2008.



22
23 John C. Coughenour
24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
25
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